I have been wrong a few times in the sixty-plus years I’ve
been on Earth. Was I wrong about the risk of technical failure in biosimilar
development in my June26th post on virtual biosimilar development? To be clear, what I
mean by technical failure is that the molecule produced and taken through
testing turns out to be non-comparable to the original biologic, either because
it has less effectiveness or greater risks of adverse events, including
immunogenicity. Therecent news about the 40% “first-cycle” approval rate for the first ten
biosimilar applications reviewed by the FDA caused me to take another look at
the risk of technical failure. I do not believe that the startling low first
cycle approval rate indicates that the technical difficulty of creating a
reasonably good biosimilar is very high, and that the better explanation for
the low initial approval rate may be expressed in one of my very favorite films
of all time, “Cool Hand Luke.” “Captain,” the brutal Warden of the chain gang
prison to which Cool Hand Luke is sentenced, explains the need to punish Luke by
saying “What we’ve got here is a failure to communicate.” While I would never
ever suggest any real similarity or parallel between the FDA and that prison,
it does seem to me that the best explanation for the low first-pass approval
rate for biosimilar applications is indeed a failure to communicate. A closer look
at the six biosimilar applications which received Complete Response Letters
(CRLs) instead of approval helps to clarify the issue. Here is a list of the
biosimilars that received a CRL and the basis for the CRL:
1. Hospira’s Epoetin zeta approval
was delayed by manufacturing concerns. There were no concerns about the actual
molecules safety or efficacy (the drug has been on the market in Europe for
some time).
2. Pfizer’s Epoetin alph was also
delayed because of manufacturing concerns; previous requests for more clinical
data were satisfied. So this molecule also is approvable by the FDA.
There were three different applications
for biosimilars for Pegfilgrastim and all have been delayed.
3. Coherus’ Pegfilgrastim was
delayed by the FDA’s request for a reanalysis of a subset of samples with a
revised immunogenicity assay and to provide additional manufacturing-related process
information. Clinical data on efficacy and adverse reactions apparently were
apparently satisfactory to the FDA. So although is possible that the revised
immunogenicity assay will disclose some issue with the molecule, it is more
likely that the delays in the Pegfilgrastim biosimilar applications indicate
that the FDA is simply unsure of exactly how to assess immunogenicity for pegylated biosimilar
proteins.
4. Apotex’s Pegfilgrastim––Apotex
has not disclosed the concerns raised by the FDA in its CRL.
5. Sandoz’s Pegfilgrastim––There also
was no disclosure by Sandoz of the concerns expressed by the FDA in its CRL.
However, the data from 3 clinical trials, including two trials for safety and
efficacy in breast cancer patients would seem to demonstrate that the molecule is
safe and effective in treating chemotherapy-induced neutropenia. Here too it
appears that the FDA has additional concerns to be addressed for pegylated
proteins and is still considering how to best resolve those concerns.
6. Celtrion’s infliximab was approved
in the second cycle after the provision of additional data. This proves that the
molecule was a reasonable and functional biosimilar but that Celtrion and the
FDA had not reached an earlier understanding as to exactly what needed to be
included in the biosimilar application.
There are two conclusions that can be drawn from this limited
data set of the first ten applications. First, manufacturing issues are always
a concern for biologics. Biosimilar manufacturers need to make a good
biosimilar, but they also need to make it in an impeccable facility. Second,
the FDA has concerns about pegylated proteins (such as Pegfilgrastim) that are
still evolving. Manufacturing issues aside, the developers of cytokines and
antibody biosimilars have produced approvable molecules. The 29 biosimilars on
the market in the EU with very few (if any) involuntary withdrawals for safety are
clear evidence of the relative rate technical success. The European experience with biosimilars points to the conclusion that the risk
of technical failure in biosimilar development is low. The early going at the
FDA represents a learning curve in the data collection, submission, and review
process for the biosimilar developers and the FDA. I do not believe I was wrong
about the technical difficulty of creating a biosimilar. What we’ve got here is
a failure to communicate precisely what needs to be done to obtain the FDA’s
approval.