There are two different storms
brewing in the pharmaceutical world. On the one hand there is increasing opposition
to the very high prices of drugs. On the other hand there is ever more pressure
to accelerate access to drugs for seriously-ill patients. President Trump
expressed both of these very different concerns in his January 31st meeting with pharmaceutical
executives, during which he called drug prices “astronomical” while also vowing to
“streamline” the process of drug approval. It is vital that the cost of new
drugs not overwhelm patients and the health care system. It is also important
to get drugs to desperate patients as quickly as possible.
However,
accelerated access allows a drug to reach the market quickly, based on clinical
trials that measure surrogate endpoints, for instance
time to cancer progression or observed tumor response rates, rather than
survival rates. These surrogate endpoints frequently fail to predict whether
patients will actually live longer or have a better quality of life, but are
used because they can be measured within a relatively short period of time,
while evidence as to the real effectiveness of a drug can take years to
collect. At the same time, any reasonable approach to drug pricing requires substantial
knowledge of a drug’s effectiveness for its value to be considered when
evaluating the drug’s price and that knowledge simply is not available when a
drug is approved before its performance is known on truly meaningful endpoints such
as overall survival (in cancer) or long-term ability to function (in diseases
such as Parkinson’s or Muscular Dystrophy. With Congress and the President both
seeking to change the current system, there may be an opportunity to pursue a
different approach to accelerated approval and, at the same time, take at least
a small step towards reducing the costs of new, potentially life-saving drugs. One
way to strike a better balance between accelerated access and limiting drug
prices until their value is known might be a new form of “conditional approval”
with prices discounted until full approval is warranted.
The Issues with Accelerated Approval
The
FDA’s accelerated approval of eteplirsen, a new antisense drug for Duchenne
Muscular Dystrophy (DMD), is a clear example of both problems——“astronomical
prices” and accelerated access. DMD is a devastating illness that affects
children and causes muscle weakness and eventual death. There are no effective
treatments. Understandably there was enormous pressure from patient groups to
approve the drug despite the lack of evidence that the drug actually works, beyond a change in a surrogate marker.
The drug is now available at a
price of $300,000 per patient per year, but it may be years before the data
from additional clinical trials can provide substantial evidence of whether or
not the drug is effective. If the drug turns out not to provide meaningful
clinical benefit, then the $300,000 per year cost of providing patients the
drug is a terrible waste of our health care dollars. However, if insurers do
not pay for the drug and it actually would provide significant therapeutic
benefit to Duchenne’s patients, then there would be even more terrible
unnecessary suffering and death among DMD patients.
Eteplirsen
is not by any means the only drug approved before the real risks were known or, in some
cases, a lack of real efficacy was demonstrated. One useful
model for accelerated access and controlled pricing was developed in response
to an earlier era of crisis in pharmaceutical policy when the HIV epidemic
first caused a public outcry for accelerated access. Prior to the AIDS crisis
of the 1980s, major patient advocacy groups, such as the American Cancer
Society and the American Heart Association, focused their efforts on raising
money for research and paid virtually no attention to the FDA. With AIDS, and
particularly with ACT UP (AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power), the world changed. For
the first time there was enormous pressure on the FDA to do something—anything—to
get drugs out to patients before all of the safety and efficacy data was in.
The FDA
responded to the AIDS crisis with a number of efforts to expand early access. One
that has the most relevance for today was the 1992 parallel track initiative. The parallel track initiative, was
used only once for stavudine, a still-experimental drug that was made widely
available to physicians treating AIDS patients.
The drug sponsor could seek to charge for the drug but only in an amount
sufficient to recover its costs for the trial, which required financial
disclosures to the FDA. Treating physicians providing the parallel track drug
were required to provide the sponsor with basic data on their patients and
patients’ responses to treatment.
How Conditional
Approval Could Work
A
more balanced approach to the current cry for accelerated access and lower
prices could adapt and build on the 1992 HIV-only parallel track approach. The
two key components that could be revised for today’s use are: first, an accelerated
approval that permits wide distribution before final approval; and, second, a
mechanism that limits the price of the conditionally-approved drugs while more
data is collected. Conditional approval based on surrogate endpoints would
allow a drug’s sponsor to distribute the drug to all of the desperately ill
patients who have no alternative, while maintaining the price restrictions
until additional data on actual clinical benefit and risk is provided. This
would provide a 21st Century update of the 1992 HIV-only Parallel
Track.
Under
the conditional approval proposed here any physician treating a patient with
the targeted indication could prescribe the drug and would agree to collect and
report basic data on the duration of treatment, responses to the drug, and any
other changes in their patients’ conditions. Such longer-term single arm trials
are likely to provide evidence of real effectiveness and safety when the target
is an untreatable serious disease. While the drug is being widely used and the
data collected, the sponsor could charge for the drug based on a set price
formula until the sponsor provides further data and the FDA completes its
review. There would be no need for case-by-case negotiations over costs and
pricing as was required by the 1992 Parallel Track policy. This differs from other
accelerated access programs that use the term “conditional approval” (such as that used by the European Medicines
Evaluation Agency, which does not limit prices and must be reviewed annually).
Determining Prices
for Conditionally Approved Drugs
How
might the predetermined discounted price provision work? One possible mechanism
would require a pharmaceutical company seeking conditional approval to specify
its intended initial market price for the new drug. The conditional approval
distribution price could be limited to 25 percent of the specified initial
market price. Alternatively, the conditional approval price formula might be a predetermined
percentage of the average introductory price of breakthrough drugs approved
during the prior two years. Unlike the prior Parallel Track provisions, either
price formula would avoid the need for the sponsor to disclose its costs and
negotiate with the FDA to justify charging during the conditional approval
period. Given the strong demand by patients for a potentially life-saving drug when
there is no effective alternative, marketing expenses should be low.
With the very low cost of small
molecule manufacture or even the higher costs of manufacturing biologic drugs,
the 25 percent pricing formula should cover the costs of manufacture,
distribution, a limited marketing outreach, and the process of data collection
and still provide a modest profit. This conditional approval update of Parallel
Track would provide the needed balance between access to potential breakthrough
drugs and substantial evidence to support their unrestricted entry into the
marketplace. Limiting profits would motivate drug companies to distribute the
drug widely enough to provide the needed evidence as expeditiously as possible.
And in an era of skyrocketing prices for new drugs it would avoid imposing even
greater costs to consumers and insurers for what are actually experimental
drugs such as eteplirsen.
A Way Forward with Conditional Approval
New proposals
are being discussed that would even further accelerate access to new drugs and members of both parties in the House and Senate
are moving forward with a variety of approaches to the high cost of new drugs. Now is the
time to take a new approach to accelerating access and limiting drug prices. Of
course, it would also be necessary to require insurers and government payers to
cover the drugs during the conditional approval period in the same way that
they currently cover drugs approved under the accelerated access and
breakthrough drug procedures. If the data confirms the benefit of the
treatment, full approval would be granted and the drug sponsor could charge
whatever price it can justify in the marketplace, but with much better evidence
as to what the drug’s real worth actually is. Patients desperate for treatment
would get access to drugs, insurers would be paying less than under the current
system, and patients, providers and insurers would get the data they need on
the drug’s efficacy. It is time for a new approach to accelerated access that
is good for patients and good for us all.
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