This
week’s post is about the problem of product liability in pharmaceutical policy,
an issue that I have not discussed since my first posts on this blog in
February. Boerhinger-Ingelheim’s drug Pradaxa
(dabigatran) is a “thrombin inhibitor,” an anticoagulant drug used to prevent
strokes and embolisms in patients with atrial fibrillation or other conditions
that put them at high risk for stroke. One of the principal selling points of
Pradaxa and other direct thrombin inhibitors is that their recommended use does
not monitoring patient’s blood levels of the drug, unlike the much older drug Coumadin
(warfarin) which is used for the same purpose but has a different mechanism of
action and requires individual dosing and monitoring. Pradaxa has been the
subject of very interesting news this past week, initiated by an article by
Deborah Cohen, M.D. in the British Medical Journal (BMJ) entitled: Concerns over data in key dabigatran trial. Accompanying the article was a feature editorial
with the even more attention-grabbing title: Dabigatran: how the drug company withheld important analyses
Thursday, July 31, 2014
Wednesday, July 23, 2014
Pharmaceutical Pricing-- The Story That Just Keeps Going
After last week’s foray into patents and
pharmaceutical policy, which is perhaps the most technical and specialized area
of pharmaceutical policy, I will return to the never-ending story of pharmaceutical
prices and the controversy over Sovaldi, Gilead's break-through Hepatitis C
drug. Sovaldi has a "sticker
price" of $84,000 for a 12-week course of treatment, at the end of which
90% or more of patients would be expected to be cured. Since Sovaldi is a pill
that is given once a day, the 12-weeks of treatment means that there are 84
daily doses. The math is easy, even if the price, unlike the pill, is hard to
swallow--$1,000 per pill. The drug has been a huge financial success for
Gilead, which reported
$2.274 billion in sales in just the first quarter of 2014. However, the backlash has been equally
huge. In a rare display of
bipartisanship in Washington, Senator Ron Wyden (D.-Ore), the Chair of the
Senate Finance Committee and Senator Chuck Grassley (R.-Iowa), the Ranking
Member of the Finance Committee, sent a demand
for information concerning the development costs of Sovaldi and Gilead’s
pricing decision. However, even more
than the investigation by two senior senators, the impetus for today’s post
came from the blog RxObserver, which featured a post
entitled Sovaldi: A Poster Child for Predatory Pricing [sic]. Before discussing the epithet “predatory
pricing,” the perspective of RxObserver requires a bit of explanation. RxObserver is a site that primarily provides
the views of pharmaceutical benefit managers (PBMs), or as the blog itself
states its purpose: “the Clearinghouse of the Future for Pharmacy Benefits.” It
is, in general, a very high-quality blog, with an editorial staff composed
primarily of well-recognized academic and government experts in health care
policy. I regularly read it and find it
useful, although I was taken aback by that “predatory” epithet. Download PDF
Wednesday, July 16, 2014
The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Developments in the Intersection of Patents and Pharmaceutical Policy
download PDF
This week I am focusing on patent law, which is one of the more arcane and technical areas of pharmaceutical policy. A recent major decision by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) in Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Teva Pharmaceuticals (BMS v. Teva) is rather remarkable in the degree to which it departs from prior decisions on the patentability of small molecules as the active ingredients in drugs. Chris Holman, a leading scholar in the intersection of intellectual property and the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries, wrote a great article a few years ago arguing that a significant degree of unpredictability in patent law would substantially depress pharmaceutical innovation. Holman argues persuasively that the uncertainty as to whether or not a patent claim to a drug's active ingredient would be enforceable is, in essence, an additional cost burden on pharmaceutical research and development, and that this increasing cost burden is responsible for a decrease in the output of pharmaceutical research. Holman pointed to a long period of stagnation in the number of new drugs approved as evidence of the decreased output of pharmaceutical research. He uses two examples of Eli Lilly patents that had been invalidated as evidence of the unpredictability of patent law. Holman's analysis of the unpredictability problem centered on three different ways in which uncertainty is created:
This week I am focusing on patent law, which is one of the more arcane and technical areas of pharmaceutical policy. A recent major decision by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) in Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Teva Pharmaceuticals (BMS v. Teva) is rather remarkable in the degree to which it departs from prior decisions on the patentability of small molecules as the active ingredients in drugs. Chris Holman, a leading scholar in the intersection of intellectual property and the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries, wrote a great article a few years ago arguing that a significant degree of unpredictability in patent law would substantially depress pharmaceutical innovation. Holman argues persuasively that the uncertainty as to whether or not a patent claim to a drug's active ingredient would be enforceable is, in essence, an additional cost burden on pharmaceutical research and development, and that this increasing cost burden is responsible for a decrease in the output of pharmaceutical research. Holman pointed to a long period of stagnation in the number of new drugs approved as evidence of the decreased output of pharmaceutical research. He uses two examples of Eli Lilly patents that had been invalidated as evidence of the unpredictability of patent law. Holman's analysis of the unpredictability problem centered on three different ways in which uncertainty is created:
the
proliferation of loosely defined standards rather than bright line
rules; unpredictability associated with long-delayed clarification of
critical and identifiable ambiguities in patent law; and perhaps
worst of all, unpredictability that occurs when courts adopt a new
interpretation of legal doctrine and apply it retroactively, to the
detriment of the investment-backed expectations of patent owners.
Monday, July 7, 2014
The End May Not Be Near But The Future Is Not Looking Very Good
I
have always been an optimist about the future of biotechnology and
the future contribution of the life-sciences industry to health and
healthcare. There have been a fair number of market cycles since I
first began studying the biotechnology industry in 1984. When venture
capital was tight or the window for initial public offerings slammed
shut, I was always confident that those downturns in financing were
temporary. Sooner or later the level of investments in early-stage
biotech would rebound and the public markets would again be open to
biotech companies with significant products in later stage
development. My optimism that the markets would recover rested on my
faith in the long-term rationality of the investment markets, both
public and private. As long as basic research continued to provide
the foundation for significant commercial opportunities, sooner or
later profit-seeking investors would seize on those opportunities.
It is the "as long as basic research" part of that premise
that
causes
me to
be concerned.
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