This week I am focusing on patent law, which is one of the more arcane and technical areas of pharmaceutical policy. A recent major decision by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) in Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Teva Pharmaceuticals (BMS v. Teva) is rather remarkable in the degree to which it departs from prior decisions on the patentability of small molecules as the active ingredients in drugs. Chris Holman, a leading scholar in the intersection of intellectual property and the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries, wrote a great article a few years ago arguing that a significant degree of unpredictability in patent law would substantially depress pharmaceutical innovation. Holman argues persuasively that the uncertainty as to whether or not a patent claim to a drug's active ingredient would be enforceable is, in essence, an additional cost burden on pharmaceutical research and development, and that this increasing cost burden is responsible for a decrease in the output of pharmaceutical research. Holman pointed to a long period of stagnation in the number of new drugs approved as evidence of the decreased output of pharmaceutical research. He uses two examples of Eli Lilly patents that had been invalidated as evidence of the unpredictability of patent law. Holman's analysis of the unpredictability problem centered on three different ways in which uncertainty is created:
the
proliferation of loosely defined standards rather than bright line
rules; unpredictability associated with long-delayed clarification of
critical and identifiable ambiguities in patent law; and perhaps
worst of all, unpredictability that occurs when courts adopt a new
interpretation of legal doctrine and apply it retroactively, to the
detriment of the investment-backed expectations of patent owners.
I
think that Holman's article is an important contribution to the
discussion of patents and pharmaceutical policy. In light of the
June 12, 2014, decision of the CAFC in BMS
v. Teva,
I would like to add some additional thoughts on this important issue.
Although I do not entirely agree with Holman's assertion that the
uncertainty in patent protection has already been a very significant
factor in the diminishing relative productivity of the pharmaceutical
industry, Holman was absolutely correct in his assertion that the
return on investment which is made possible by patent protection is
of fundamental importance to investment in pharmaceutical research.
In the long run, if uncertainty in patent law increases to the point
where the CAFC regularly finds a significant percentage of active
ingredient drug patents to be invalid, then it would be devastating
to the pharmaceutical industry and the development of important new
drugs. It does not yet appear to be the case. However, it is an
issue that requires and deserves a significant amount of further
research; and, if the BMS
v. Teva
decision is a harbinger of things to come, it might soon become a
major issue.
So,
what is "good" in patents from a pharmaceutical policy
perspective? As Chris Holman's article states, predictability is
good. However predictability in and of itself is not
good if the result of predictability is a continuing stream of very
similar drugs competing on the basis of marginal differences on
endpoints other than real safety and efficacy (see my posts of April
12th,
18th,
and 26th).
"Good" from a pharmaceutical policy perspective would be
interpretations of patent law that lead to both predictability and
more
innovation. In a 2008 article (Reach-Through
Claims for Drug Target Patents: Rx for Pharmaceutical Policy,
Nat.
Biotech.
26:55-56),
I argued that
it would be good to provide a broad scope of patent protection for
inventors who establish the therapeutic utility of a new biological
target (such as a receptor or an enzyme which had not previously been
a key feature in other drugs' mechanisms of action). My argument was
that the biggest value-added step in pharmaceutical research is the
validation of new targets for drugs and that providing greater
protection when such research succeeded would lead to greater
innovation and fewer me-too drugs.
What
is "bad" in pharmaceutical policy? As Holman argued,
unpredictability is bad; and, when it comes in the form of new
interpretations of patent law applied retroactively, it can get
"ugly." The CAFC decision in Ariad
Pharmaceuticals v. Eli Lilly
might well be an example of a new interpretation of patent law
applied retroactively to the detriment of the inventors and their
investors. That is not to say that the patent should have been
upheld, but rather that from a predictability perspective it went
badly wrong in finding the patent invalid because of a new
interpretation of the written description requirement. The Ariad
court
held that
a written description in a patent is insufficient to support a
reach-through claim to a drug target even if the description enables
others to practice the invention. The CAFC struck down Ariad's claim
despite their holding in a prior case, U.
of Rochester v. Searle,
that a very similar reach-through claim was invalid only because it
failed to enable others to practice the invention. In other words,
the CAFC raised the bar, which is a form of unpredictability that is
in Holman's terms "worst of all," if not downright "ugly."
Why
was the outcome in BMS
v. Teva
particularly difficult to predict? The issue in the case centered on
the obviousness of Entecavir, the active ingredient in BMS's
Hepatitis B drug Baraclude. To translate the key patent term
"obviousness"
for non-patent lawyers, an invention must be "non-obvious"
to a person who has ordinary skill and knowledge of the field of the
invention, such as pharmaceutical chemistry, and who has studied the
scientific and technical literature that relates to the invention.
For a chemical compound, such as the active ingredient in BMS's drug,
this means that the invention would not have been obvious both as to
the precise structure of the molecule and its success as a drug with
relatively low toxicity and its low susceptibility to resistance by
the Hepatitis B virus.
In
the case of BMS's drug the CAFC upheld a decision that the active
ingredient was obvious despite the fact that it combines features
from two previously known molecular structures (2'-CDG and Madhavan
30) that share most of their basic elements (a "carbocyclic"
ring attached to a "guanine" ring).
For
the chemists who read this, below are the four chemical structures
discussed in the opinion. The
non-chemists can just skip ahead to the conclusion. (The PDF displays the structures better than this html.)
Deoxyguanosine, shown top right, is a naturally occurring nucleoside that has no antiviral properties. 2'-CDG, lower left, has antiviral properties and is different than deoxyguanosine because it replaces the "O" oxygen atom in the top of the left-hand pyramid with a carbon (dotted circles in the diagram). Madhavan compound 30, shown bottom right, differs from both deoxyguanosine AND 2'-CDG because it has a double-bonded carbon at the top (5') position of the carbocyclic ring at the left of the chemical structure AND has no NH2 group at the bottom of the guanine ring on the right-hand side of the structure (a difference that escaped a dotted circle in the CAFC opinion for reasons that are not "obvious" to me). Madhavan compound 30 has antiviral activity. Thus BMS's drug differs from 2'-CDG in one position and from Madhavan compound 30 in a second position. While it may have been obvious to try combining features of both structures or, in CAFC terms, using 2'-CDG as a lead structure and adding a key feature of Madhavan compound 30, few experts would have predicted with confidence that the resulting drug would work as well as it did and, given its unexpected ability to avoid viral resistance, the patent on the drug would be held invalid on obviousness grounds.
Conclusion:
As I have previously stated, I am generally opposed to a patent
policy that results in the development of competing drugs with active
ingredients and with no clear difference in their safety or
effectiveness. BMS invested tens of millions of dollars based on the
patentability of their drug's active ingredient. The decision by the
CAFC clearly went counter to BMS's expectations and results in a
significant problem of unpredictability in pharmaceutical patents. In
the absence of a relatively clear standard for the patentability of
small molecules, the CAFC's decision in
BMS v. Teva only
creates greater uncertainty without any real gain in pharmaceutical
policy terms. Bright-line rules that clearly demarcate the standards
for patentability are not always "good", but,
unpredictability in patent law, as Holman persuasively argued, is
always "bad." For Bristol-Myers Squibb unpredictability
became downright "ugly."
No comments:
Post a Comment