I have more than a few
thoughts about biosimilars, but will provide a more extensive version
of my views at a later date. For now, I would like to point to two
significant new developments in the biosimilars field, both in the
news this week. In the first, the FDA released a Draft Guidance that
provides more details of the Agency's approach to the nitty
gritty of the clinical testing of investigational biosimilar
products.1
In the second major biosimilar news of the week, Samsung (yes,
Samsung the Korean electronics giant) announced that it is committing
at least $2 billion dollars to developing biopharmaceuticals through
two separate efforts. In one venture, "Samsung Bioepis" is partnering with Biogen Idec to develop biopharmaceuticals including
biosimilar versions of Roche's Herceptin
anti-cancer antibody as well Sanofi's Lantus diabetes drug.2
In Samsung's other biologics effort, Samsung Biologics will work with
Quintiles, the global contract research organization (CRO), to develop
biologics for Roche and Bristol Meyers Squibb. I believe that taken
together these two events, the FDA's emerging regulatory requirements
and Samsung's commitment to biologics and particularly biosimilars,
underscore the two very different kinds of risk that confront
entrants into the biosimilars field. The first risk, which is
reflected in the FDA's Draft Guidance, is the scientific/regulatory
risk that is entirely a function of the developing science of protein
production and analysis. The second risk, which is reflected in
Samsung's partnerships with Biogen Idec, Roche, and Bristol Meyers
Squibb, is the market risk, which is a function of the difficulties
of competing both against the original "reference" biologic
as well as the other entrants into the biosimilars field. I am
willing to stick my neck out on this issue and say that, in my view,
it is this second risk that is more significant.
Let me explain why I believe the
marketplace risk, or at least marketplace uncertainty, is greater
than the scientific/regulatory risk of failing to achieve FDA
approval to market a biosimilar drug. There has been a great deal
written about the difficulty, or even impossibility, of creating a
second biologic that is an exact duplicate of a reference biologic,
regardless of whether the reference biologic is a signaling protein,
such as erythropoeitin, IL-2, interferon-beta, and alpha interferon, or a therapeutic antibody, such as Rituxan, Avastin, Herceptin, and
Humira. Leaving aside the question of whether or not perfect duplication
with 100% confidence is indeed impossible, there is good reason to
believe that functionally acceptable working copies of those proteins
can be made with only a small chance of outright failure. The
ability to engineer proteins (including the humanization of
antibodies), assay their affinity for their pharmacological target,
and produce therapeutic biologics has come a long way. In Europe,
where biosimilars have been allowed for some time, as of 2011 there
had been 14 biosimilars approved and one that was rejected for
reasons relating to quality control, characterization, or
manufacturing issues, with another application withdrawn.3
That success ratio has continued, and it is in marked contrast to
the risks faced in developing new chemical entities as drugs. There
are numerous extremely good university labs which could, for a few
million dollars (on the high side), perform the contract research
necessary to deliver a cell-line that would produce a very good
version of a reference protein or antibody. Samsung has already
partnered with Quintiles to do the clinical/regulatory development
necessary to take a product through biosimilar approval. GMP (good manufacturing practice) contract
biologics manufacturing is an existing and expandable resource.
Nothing is absolutely certain, but the risk of outright
scientific/technological failure is not very high.
While biosimilar approvals have been reasonably forthcoming in Europe, market share has been very slow to build, which is why I have taken the position here that the risk of the marketplace is actually more significant than the scientific regulatory risk. Biosimilars may not be freely substituted for the reference drug at the pharmacy, unlike generics of small molecule drugs. This means that, for the most part, biosimilar adoption requires marketing to physicians, just as brand name drugs are marketed, in an effort to persuade doctors to prescribe the biosimilar in place of a reference drug that the doctors have presumably been satisfied with and that is working in the doctors' patients. That is why a 2013 study by the European Commission’s (EC) Enterprise and Industry Directorate-General found that biosimilars only accounted for an 11% market share.4 However, that market share varied widely between countries, with Germany and Greece using the power of their national health authorities to boost biosimilar adoption to far higher levels than in the rest of Western Europe.
In
fact, the high rate of adoption of biosimilars in Germany and Greece
points the way to the real solution to biosimilar development (and
pricing). My former colleagues, Brian A. Liang and Timothy Mackey,
recently coauthored an article entitled Public-Private
Partnerships to Promote Biosimilar Access, Affordability, and Patient
Safety in Emerging Markets online in the Stanford Journal of Law, Science & Policy (April
2014). In their article Liang and Mackey propose that
biopharmaceutical companies work with the national authorities in
developing countries in order to ensure that patients in those
countries have affordable access to needed biologics. I heartily
endorse Liang and Mackey's proposal; however, I would suggest that
entirely different public-private partnerships might well be needed
to encourage the development of much lower cost biosimilars in
developed countries, such as the U.K. and France. If I am correct in
my assertion that marketshare is a more significant risk than the
scientific and regulatory challenge of developing a biosimilar, then
the answer is to greatly reduce, or even eliminate, much of the
market risk. That is actually something that the National Health
Service both can and must do if citizens in the U.K., for example,
are to have expanded access to biosimilar drugs with ever tighter
budgets. If the U.K.'s National Health Service were to actually put
out an RFP for the development of an anti-TNF antibody, for example,
how low would the price go? Could a lab at Cambridge or Oxford
produce a lead cell line? Could Quintiles or Paraxel manage the
clinical and regulatory development? Could Wacker Chemie AG, for
example, manage the contract manufacturing and scale up? If Samsung
or another lead partner had complete confidence that, at the end of
the day, success in the U.K. marketplace were guaranteed, the bidding
would be very interesting indeed.
So
we can and should accelerate the development and usage of
biosimilars by taking the marketplace risk out of the equation. The
NHS and other national health systems in Europe can lead the way. It
would take the market risk out of biosimilar development and
potentially produce much greater savings in the biosimilars
marketplace. One small step for pharmaceutical policy and a lengthy
stride for health care cost reduction.
1
FDA, Clinical
Pharmacology Data
to
Support a Demonstration of Biosimilarity to a Reference Product:
Draft Guidance,
May 2104, available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM397017.pdf.
2
BioSpectrum,
Electronics giant
enters the Pharma market, May
12, 2014, available at
http://www.biospectrumasia.com/biospectrum/news/214601/electronics-giant-enters-pharma-market#.U3fySl6ukYQ
. Yiddish speakers may find the name
Bioepis ironic and amusing.
3B.S.
Sekhon and V. Saluja, Biosimilars: an Overview
(2011) available at
http://www.dovepress.com/biosimilars-an-overview-peer-reviewed-article-BS
4Use
of Biosimilars in Europe,
posted on 10/05/2013 in Generics and Biosimilars Initiative,
available at
http://www.gabionline.net/Reports/Use-of-biosimilars-in-Europe.
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